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Abstract
Multilayer networks allow for modeling complex relationships, where individuals are embedded in multiple social
networks at the same time. Given the ubiquity of such relationships, these networks have been increasingly gaining
attention in the literature. This paper presents the first analysis of the robustness of centrality measures against
strategic manipulation in multilayer networks. More specifically, we consider an “evader” who strategically chooses
which connections to form in a multilayer network in order to obtain a low centrality-based ranking—thereby reducing
the chance of being highlighted as a key figure in the network—while ensuring that she remains connected to a certain
group of people. We prove that determining an optimal way to “hide” is NP-complete and hard to approximate for
most centrality measures considered in our study. Moreover, we empirically evaluate a number of heuristics that the
evader can use. Our results suggest that the centrality measures that are functions of the entire network topology are
more robust to such a strategic evader than their counterparts which consider each layer separately.
1 Introduction
Owing to several incidents in the past few years, most notably those concerning the American presidential elections
of 2016, the general public has become increasingly concerned with the privacy and security of their online activities
[22]. Experts, however, had been warning about such potential risks long ago. For instance, Mislove et al. [20]
famously showed that, by coupling the social network of a given Facebook user with publicly-known attributes of
some other users, it is possible to infer otherwise-private information about that user. Worryingly, this is true not only
for typically innocuous data, but also for potentially-sensitive confidential information such as political preferences
(as demonstrated in the case of Cambridge Analytica), or even sexual orientation [14].
Various proposals on how to deal with such privacy challenges have already been put forward. Among those pro-
posals is the General Data Protection Regulation, implemented in May 2018, which is perhaps the most well-known
attempt to use state-enforced, legal instruments [8]. On the other hand, there have been a plethora of algorithmic solu-
tions for privacy protection [16, 13]. Perhaps the most well-known such solutions come from the network anonymiza-
tion and de-anonymization literature [29, 21, 12], which studies the problem faced by a data trustee who publishes
anonymized network data to be analyzed for various purposes. In this literature, the responsibility of protecting the pri-
vacy of the network members lies solely on the shoulders of the data trustee, while the network members are implicitly
assumed to be passive in this regard. In contrast, a recent body of work studies ways in which the network members
can themselves protect their own privacy by acting strategically to evade various tools from the social network analy-
sis toolkit [19]. In this context, three fundamental classes of tools have been considered: (1) centrality measures, (2)
community detection algorithms; and (3) link prediction algorithms. More specifically, Waniek et al. [25, 24] studied
how key individuals in a social network could rewire the network to avoid being highlighted by centrality measures
while maintaining their own influence within the network. The authors also studied how a group of individuals could
avoid being identified by community detection algorithms. Furthermore, Yu et al. [28], Waniek et al. [26], and Zhou et
al. [30] studied how to hide one’s sensitive relationships from link prediction algorithms.
The aforementioned literature on the strategic behaviour of network members demonstrates that it is indeed pos-
sible to develop reasonably effective heuristics to escape detection by fundamental network analysis tools. However,
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the main limitation of this literature is that it focuses only on standard, single-layered networks. In contract, people
often interact with each other via a complicated pattern of relationships, thereby creating multiple subsystems, or
“layers”, of connectivity. This is even more so nowadays when many of us belong to multiple social media platforms
simultaneously. Furthermore, multilayer networks are increasingly being recognized not only in the context of human
interactions, but also in many natural and engineered systems [6]. For instance, to travel from one point to another in
many urban transportation networks, one can choose between a road subnetwork (car or taxis), bus or tram subnet-
work, subway subnetwork, local train subnetwork, bike subnetwork, footpath subnetwork, or any combination thereof.
Each such subnetwork has its own distinct characteristics, which become difficult, or even impossible, to account for
if modelled as a single layer due to the interdependencies between the different layers. The theoretical and empirical
analysis of multilayer networks has recently attracted significant attention (see the work by Kivela¨ et al. [15] for a
comprehensive review). This new body of research is primarily driven by the fact that, due to the much more complex
nature of multilayer networks, many results for singlelayer networks become obsolete.
Motivated by these observations, we present in this paper the first analysis of how to protect ones’ privacy against
centrality measures in multilayer networks. Specifically, we consider an evader who wishes to connect to a certain
group of individuals, without being highlighted by centrality measures as a key member in the multilayer network. To
this end, the evader has to strategically choose at which layer(s) to connect to those individuals. We prove that the
corresponding optimization problem is NP-complete and hard to approximate for most centrality measures considered
in our study. Furthermore, we empirically evaluate a number of heuristic algorithms that the evader can use. The
results of this evaluation suggest that the centrality measures that are functions of the entire network topology are
more robust to such a strategic evader than their counterparts which consider each layer separately.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Network Notation and Definitions
Let G = (V,E) ∈ G denote a simple (single-layer) network, where V is the set of n nodes and E ⊆ V × V the set of
edges. We denote an edge between nodes v and w by (v, w).
In this paper we consider multilayer networks, i.e., networks where edges can represent different types of relations.
We will denote a multilayer network by M = (VL, EL, V, L) ∈ M, where V is the set of nodes, L is the set of layers
(i.e., types of relations), VL ⊆ V × L is the set of occurrences of nodes in layers (e.g., having (v, α) ∈ VL means
that node v appears in layer α), and EL ⊆ VL × VL is the set of edges. We will denote an occurrence of node
v in layer α by vα. Note that V = {v : ∃α∈Lvα ∈ VL}. Let V α be the set of nodes occurring in layer α, i.e.,
V α = {v ∈ V : vα ∈ VL}, and let Gα denote the simple network consisting of all the nodes and edges in layer α, i.e.,
Gα = (V α, {(v, w) : (vα, wα) ∈ EL}).
We focus on undirected networks, i.e., we do not discern between edges (vα, wβ) and (wβ , vα). Moreover, we do
not consider self-loops, i.e., ∀vα∈VL(vα, vα) /∈ EL. Multilayer network allow for inter-layer edges, which are edges
between two layers; they may connect two different nodes, or may connect two occurrences of the same node. We
restrict our attention to networks with diagonal couplings, i.e., networks where every inter-layer edge connects two
occurrences of the same node, i.e., ∀(vα,wβ)∈ELα 6= β → v = w.
Notice that, in some literature, multilayer networks with diagonal couplings are called multiplex networks. How-
ever, it is also typically assumed that the multiplex networks are node-aligned (i.e., every node occurs in every layer),
which is not the case in our setting. Hence, we will use the more general term “multilayer networks”. For a compre-
hensive discussion of the nomenclature, see Kivela¨ et al. [15].
A path in a simple network is an ordered sequence of nodes in which every two consecutive nodes are connected
by an edge. A path in a multilayer network is an ordered sequence of node occurrences in which every two consecutive
occurrences are connected by an edge. The length of a path is the number of edges in that path. The set of all shortest
paths between a pair of nodes, v, w ∈ V will be denoted by piG(v, w). The distance between a pair of nodes v, w ∈ V
is the length of a shortest path between them, and is denoted by λG(v, w). We assume that if there does not exist a
path between v and w then λG(v, w) = ∞. In a multilayer network we consider distance between v and w to be the
shortest distance between an occurrence of v in any layer α and an occurrence of w in any layer β (possibly α 6= β).
For any node, v ∈ V , in a simple network, G, we denote by NG(v) = {w ∈ V : (v, w) ∈ E} the set of neighbors
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of v in G. Similarly, given a multilayer network M , we write NM (v) = {w ∈ V : (vα, wβ) ∈ EL}. Finally, we
denote by NαM (v) the set of neighbors of v in layer α, i.e., N
α
M (v) = {w ∈ V : (vα, wα) ∈ EL}. We will often omit
the network itself from the notation whenever it is clear from the context, e.g., by writing λ(v, w) instead of λG(v, w).
2.2 Centrality Measures
A centrality measure [3] is a function that expresses the importance of a given node in a given network. Arguably, the
best-known centrality measures are degree, closeness and betweenness.
Degree centrality [23] assumes that the importance of a node is proportional to the number of its neighbors, i.e.,
the degree centrality of node v in network G is:
cdegr(G, v) = |NG(v)|.
Closeness centrality [4] quantifies the importance of a node in terms of shortest distances from this node to all
other nodes in the network. Formally, the closeness centrality of node v in network G can be expressed as:
cclos(G, v) =
∑
w∈V \{v}
1
λG(v, w)
.
Betweenness centrality [1, 9] states that, if we consider all the shortest paths in the network, then the more such
paths traverse through a given node (it is often stated that the node controls such paths), the more important the role
of that node in the network. More formally, the betweenness centrality of node v ∈ V in network G is:
cbetw(G, v) =
∑
w,u∈V \{v}
|{p ∈ piG(w, u) : v ∈ p}|
|piG(w, u)| .
The definitions of degree and closeness centrality can be generalized to multilayer networks using the definitions of
neighbors and distance for multilayer networks (see above). As for the betweenness centrality of node v in a multilayer
network M , it grows with the number of occurrences of v on the shortest paths between pairs of other nodes:
cbetw(M,v) =
∑
w,u∈V \{v}
|{(vα, p) : vα ∈ p, p ∈ piM (w, u)}|
|piM (w, u)|
To avoid any potential confusion, the measures that are designed for simple networks will be referred to as “local
centrality measures”, since they can be applied to only a single layer. Conversely, the measures that are designed for
multilayer networks will be referred to as a “global centrality measures”, since they take all layers into consideration.
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we formally define our computational problems and then move on to analyse them.
3.1 Definitions of Computational Problems
We define the decision problems before defining the corresponding optimization problems. Here, the “group of con-
tacts” is the set of individuals to whom the evader wishes to connect while remaining hidden from centrality measures.
3.2 Decision Problems
We will define two different decision versions of this problem, starting with the global version.
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Definition 1 (Multilayer Global Hiding). This problem is defined by a tuple, (M, v̂, F, c, d), whereM = (VL, EL, V, L)
is a multilayer network, v̂ ∈ V is the evader, F ⊂ V is the group of contacts, c is a centrality measure, and d ∈ N is
a safety margin. The goal is to identify a set of edges to be added to the network, A∗ ⊆ {(v̂α, vα) : v ∈ F ∧ v̂α ∈
VL ∧ vα ∈ VL}, such that in the resulting network M̂ = (VL, EL ∪ A∗, V, L) the evader is connected with every
contact in at least one layer and there are at least d nodes with a centrality score greater than that of the evader, i.e.:
∀v∈F∃α∈L(v̂α, vα) ∈ A∗,
∃W⊂V
(
|W | ≥ d ∧ ∀v∈W c(M̂, v) > c(M̂, v̂)
)
.
We say that “v̂ is hidden” when there are at least d nodes whose centrality is greater than that of v̂.
Definition 2 (Multilayer Local Hiding). This problem is defined by a tuple, (M, v̂, F, c, (dα)α∈L), where M =
(VL, EL, V, L) is a multilayer network, v̂ ∈ V is the evader, F ⊂ V is the group of contacts, c is a central-
ity measure, and dα ∈ N is a safety margin for layer α ∈ L. The goal is to identify a set of edges to add,
A∗ ⊆ {(v̂α, vα) : v ∈ F ∧ v̂α ∈ VL ∧ vα ∈ VL}, such that in the resulting network M̂ = (VL, EL ∪ A∗, V, L)
the evader is connected with every contact in at least one layer and for each layer α the network Gα contains at least
dα nodes with a centrality score greater than that of the evader, i.e.:
∀v∈F∃α∈L(v̂α, vα) ∈ A∗,
∀α∈L∃W⊂V α
(
|W | ≥ dα ∧ ∀v∈W c(M̂α, v) > c(M̂α, v̂)
)
.
We say that “v̂ is hidden in α” if there are at least dα nodes with centrality in layer α greater than that of v̂ in α.
In the global version of the problem we assume that the seeker is able to observe and analyze the entire multilayer
network using centrality measures, hence the evader’s goal is to minimize her centrality ranking in the network as a
whole. On the other hand, the local version of the problem models situations where the seeker analyzes only one of
the layers, e.g., if the seeker gains access to the email communication network, but not to the phone-call network. In
such situations, the evader’s goal is to attain an adequate level of safety in each layer separately.
The approach to hiding represented by the two problems differs from the one developed for simple networks by
Waniek et al. [24, 25]. Their hiding algorithms focus on choosing which edge(s) to add or remove from the single
layer, often causing the evader to lose the direct connection with some of the neighbors. The algorithms presented in
our paper focus on choosing the layer in which to maintain the connection, and allow the evader to keep direct links
with all contacts. Notice that this approach cannot be applied to simple networks, as there is only one way to have a
direct link between the evader and every contact in a single layer.
3.3 Optimization Problems
We now define the corresponding optimization problems. They take into consideration a situation when it is impossible
to connect the evader with all the contacts.
Definition 3 (Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding). This problem is defined by a tuple, (M, v̂, F, c, d), where M =
(VL, EL, V, L) is a multilayer network, v̂ ∈ V is the evader, F ⊂ V is the group of contacts, c is a centrality
measure, and d ∈ N is a safety margin. The goal is then to identify a set of edges to be added to the network,
A∗ ⊆ {(v̂α, vα) : v ∈ F ∧ v̂α ∈ VL ∧ vα ∈ VL}, such that in the resulting network M̂ = (VL, EL ∪ A∗, V, L) the
evader is connected with as many contacts as possible, while there are at least d nodes with a centrality score greater
than that of the evader.
Definition 4 (Maximum Multilayer Local Hiding). This problem is defined by a tuple, (M, v̂, F, c, (dα)α∈L), where
M = (VL, EL, V, L) is a multilayer network, v̂ ∈ V is the evader, F ⊂ V is the group of contacts, c is a centrality
measure, and dα ∈ N is a safety margin for layer α ∈ L. The goal is then to identify a set of edges to be added to the
network,A∗ ⊆ {(v̂α, vα) : v ∈ F ∧ v̂α ∈ VL∧vα ∈ VL}, such that in the resulting network M̂ = (VL, EL∪A∗, V, L)
the evader is connected with as many contacts as possible, while for each layer α the network Gα contains at least dα
nodes with a centrality score greater than that of the evader.
Intuitively, the goal is to connect the evader with as many contacts as possible, while keeping the evader hidden.
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Table 1: Summary of our computational complexity results.
Centrality Multilayer Global Hiding Multilayer Local Hiding
Degree P NP-complete
Closeness NP-complete NP-complete
Betweenness NP-complete NP-complete
3.4 Complexity Analysis
The complexity results for both the global and local versions of the problem are listed below (see Table 1 for a
summary).
Observation 1. The problem of Multilayer Global Hiding is in P given the degree centrality measure. In fact, for a
given problem instance either any A∗ that connects v̂ with all contacts is a solution, or there are no solutions at all.
Proof. Any valid solution to the problem A∗ must connect the evader v̂ with all contacts. Therefore, after the addition
of A∗ the degree centrality of v̂ is |F |, while the degree centrality of every contact increases by 1. Hence, the degree
centrality ranking in the network does not depend on the choice of layers in which v̂ gets connected with its contacts.
Theorem 1. The problem of Multilayer Global Hiding is NP-complete given the closeness centrality measure.
Proof. The problem is trivially in NP, since after the addition of a given A∗ the closeness centrality ranking can be
computed in polynomial time.
Next, we prove that the problem is NP-hard. To this end, we show a reduction from the NP-complete problem of
Exact 3-Set Cover. The decision version of this problem is defined by a set of subsets S = {S1, . . . , Sm} of universe
U = {u1, . . . , u3k}, such that ∀i|Si| = 3. The goal is to determine whether there exist k pairwise disjoint elements of
S the sum of which equals U .
Given an instance of the problem of Exact 3-Set Cover, let us construct a multilayer network,M = (VL, EL, V ′, L),
as follows (Figure 1 depicts an instance of this network):
• The set of nodes V ′: For every ui ∈ U we create a node ui, as well as 3 nodes wi,1, wi,2, wi,3. We will denote the
set of all nodes ui by U , and the set of all nodes wi,j by W . We also create the evader node v̂, the node v′, and the
following four sets of nodes:
1. A = {a1, . . . , am};
2. B = {b1, . . . , b2k+2m};
3. B′ = {b′1, . . . , b′k+2m+1};
4. B′′ = {b′′1 , . . . , b′′2k+m−1}.
• The set of layers L: For every Si ∈ S we create a layer αi. We also create an additional layer β.
• The set of occurrences of nodes in layers VL: Node uj ∈ U appears in layer αi if and only if uj ∈ Si. Node
wi,j ∈ U appears only in layer αi. The evader v̂, as well as all nodes in A appear in every layer αi. Node v′, as
well as all nodes in B, B′, and B′′ appear only in layer β.
• The set of edges EL: For every node that appears in multiple layers, we connect all occurrences of this node in a
clique. For node uj in layer αi we connect it with node ai. In every layer αi we connect all nodes inA into a clique.
Moreover, we connect every node bi with node v′, and connect every node b′i with node bi. Finally, we connect
every node b′′i with node b
′
i.
Now, consider the following instance of the problem of Multilayer Global Hiding, (M, v̂, F, c, d), where:
• M is the multilayer network we just constructed;
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Figure 1: An illustration of the network used in the proof of Theorem 1. Edges connecting occurrences of the same
node in different layers are highlighted in grey. The red node represents the evader, while the white nodes represent
the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the solution to this problem instance.
• v̂ is the evader;
• F = U ∪W is the set of contacts;
• c is the closeness centrality measure;
• d = 1.
Next, let us analyze the closeness centrality values of nodes in the network. Notice that every node wi,j appears
only in a single layer αi, hence v̂ has to connect with wi,j in layer αi. Assume that the evader v̂ has connections with
nodes in U in exactly x layers, i.e., x = |{αi ∈ L : ∃uj(v̂αi , uαij ) ∈ A∗}|. We then have:
• cclos(v̂) = 3k + 3m+ x2 + m−x3 ≥ 3k + 3 13m as v̂ is a neighbor of 3k nodes in U and 3m nodes in W , while for
any ai ∈ A the distance between ai and v̂ is 2 if v̂ is connected with any uj in layer αi and 3 otherwise;
• cclos(ui) ≤ 1 +m+ 3k−12 + 3m2 = 1 12k+ 2 12m+ 12 < cclos(v̂) as ui is a neighbor of v̂ and at most m nodes in A,
while the distance to all other nodes is at least 2;
• cclos(ai) ≤ 3 +m− 1 + 12 + 3k−32 + 3m3 = 1 12k + 2m+ 1 < cclos(v̂) as ai is a neighbor of 3 nodes from U and
all other m− 1 nodes in A, while the distance to v̂ and all other nodes in U is 2, and the distance to all nodes is W
is at least 3;
• cclos(wi,j) < cclos(v̂) as for any other node v we have λ(wi,j , v) = λ(v̂, v) + 1, since the shortest paths between
wi,j and all other nodes go through v̂;
• cclos(v′) = 2k + 2m+ k+2m+12 + 2k+m−13 = 3k + 3m+ k2 + m−k3 + 16 as v′ is a neighbor of all 2k + 2m nodes
in B, the distance to all k + 2m+ 1 nodes in B′ is 2, while the distance to all m− k + 1 nodes in B′′ is 3.
We have shown that all nodes in A, U , and W have smaller closeness centrality than v̂. It is easy to check that
v′ has greater closeness centrality than all other nodes occurring in layer β. Hence, v̂ is hidden if and only if v′ has
greater closeness centrality than v̂. This is true when:
3k + 3m+
x
2
+
m− x
3
< 3k + 3m+
k
2
+
m− k
3
+
1
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which can be simplified to x < k + 1. Since both x and k are in N this is equivalent to x ≤ k. Therefore, v̂ is hidden
if and only if it has connections with nodes in U in at most k layers.
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Figure 2: An illustration of the network used in the proof of Theorem 2. The red node represents the evader, while the
white nodes represent the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the solution to this problem instance.
Now we will show that if there exists a solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem, then there
also exists a solution to the constructed instance of the Multilayer Global Hiding problem. Let S∗ be an exact cover
of U . In layer αi we connect v̂ with all nodes from W that occurr in this layer. For every Si ∈ S∗ we connect v̂ with
uj ∈ Si in layer αi. This way, v̂ becomes connected to all 3k contacts from U , since all the sets in S∗ are pairwise
disjoint.
To complete the proof, we have to show that if there exists a solution A∗ to the constructed instance of the
Multilayer Global Hiding problem, then there also exists a solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover
problem. We have shown above that if v̂ is hidden, then it is connected to nodes in U in at most k layers from
{α1, . . . , αm}. However, since v̂ must be connected with all 3k nodes in U in order for A∗ to be a correct solution,
then {Si : ∃uj(v̂αi , uαij ) ∈ A∗} is a solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem. This concludes
the proof.
Theorem 2. The problem of Multilayer Global Hiding is NP-complete given the betweenness centrality measure.
Proof. The problem is trivially in NP, since after the addition of a given A∗ the betweenness centrality rankings can
be computed in polynomial time.
Next, we prove that the problem is NP-hard. To this end, we show a reduction from the NP-complete problem of
Finding k-Clique. The decision version of this problem is defined by a simple network, G = (V,E), and a constant,
k ∈ N. The goal is to determine whether there exist k nodes in G that form a clique.
Given an instance of the problem of Finding k-Clique, defined by k and a simple network G = (V,E), let us
construct a multilayer network, M = (VL, EL, V ′, L), as follows (Figure 2 depicts an instance of this network):
• The set of nodes V ′: For every node, vi ∈ V , we create a node vi. Additionally, we create the evader node v̂, node
a, and the following three sets of nodes:
1. B = {b1, b2};
2. W = {w1, . . . , wk};
3. C = {c1, . . . , cn+k}.
• The set of layers L: We create a layer α, a layer γ, as well as n layers β1, . . . , βn.
• The set of occurrences of nodes in layers VL: Node v̂ and node a appear in layer α and all layers {β1, . . . , βn}.
Each node vi appears in layer α and βi. Nodes in W appear in all layers {β1, . . . , βn}. Nodes in B and C appear
only in layer γ.
• The set of edges EL: In layer α we create an edge between two nodes vi, vj ∈ V if and only if this edge was
present in G. In every layer where a appears we connect it with all occurring nodes from V and W . Finally, we
connect every node ci with both b1 and b2.
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Now, consider the following instance of the problem of Multilayer Local Hiding, (M, v̂, F, c, (dα)α∈L), where:
• M is the multilayer network we just constructed;
• v̂ is the evader;
• F = V ∪W is the set of contacts;
• c is the betweenness centrality measure;
• d = 2n+ 2k + 3 is the safety margin.
Notice that, since d = 2n + 2k + 3, all other nodes must have greater betweenness centrality than the evader in
order for v̂ to be hidden. Notice also that the betweenness centrality of every node ci is 1n+k . Moreover, after adding
A∗ all nodes other than v̂ have non-zero betweenness centrality. If v̂ gets connected to at least two nodes from F that
are not connected to each other, then v̂ controls one of at most n + k − 1 shortest path between them (other paths
can only go through nodes in V ∪W ∪ {a}) and thus the betweenness centrality of v̂ is at least 1n+k−1 . Therefore,
in order to get hidden, v̂ cannot control any shortest paths in the network. This implies that, if v̂ is hidden then all
nodes that are connected to v̂ in layer α must form a clique, and also implies that in every layer β, the evader v̂ can
be connected to at most one node (otherwise v̂ controls one of the shortest paths between its two neighbors without an
edges between them).
Now we will show that if there exists a solution to the given instance of the Finding k-Clique problem, then there
also exists a solution to the constructed instance of the Multilayer Global Hiding problem. Let V ∗ be a group of k
nodes forming a clique in G. Let us create A∗ by connecting v̂ to nodes from V ∗ in layer α. Now, we connect every
vi ∈ V \ V ∗ to v̂ in layer βi. In the remaining layers from {β1, . . . , βn} (corresponding to elements vi ∈ V ∗) we
connect v̂ to all nodes in W . As argued above, for such A∗, the evader v̂ is hidden, hence A∗ is a solution to the
constructed instance of the Multilayer Global Hiding problem.
To complete the proof we have to show that if there exists a solutionA∗ to the constructed instance of the Multilayer
Global Hiding problem, then there also exists a solution to the given instance of the Finding k-Clique problem. As
argued above, in each layer βi the evader v̂ can be connected to at most one node. Since all k nodes from W appear
only in layers from {β1, . . . , βn}, the evader v̂ can be connected to at most n − k nodes from V in layers from
{β1, . . . , βn}. Therefore, v̂ has to have at least k neighbors from V in layer α As shown above, in order for v̂ to be
hidden in α, all of its neighbors must form a clique. Hence, the neighbors of v̂ in layer α form a clique in G. This
concludes the proof.
Theorem 3. The problem of Multilayer Local Hiding is NP-complete given the degree centrality measure.
Proof. The problem is trivially in NP, since after the addition of a givenA∗ the degree centrality rankings for all layers
can be computed in polynomial time.
Next, we prove that the problem is NP-hard. To this end, we show a reduction from the NP-complete problem of
Exact 3-Set Cover. The decision version of this problem is defined by a set of subsets S = {S1, . . . , Sm} of universe
U = {u1, . . . , u3k}, such that ∀i|Si| = 3. The goal is to determine whether there exist k pairwise disjoint elements of
S the sum of which equals U .
Given an instance of the problem of Exact 3-Set Cover, let us construct a multilayer network,M = (VL, EL, V ′, L),
as follows (Figure 3 depicts an instance of this network):
• The set of nodes V ′: For every element, ui ∈ U , we create a node ui. We also create 2(m − k) nodes
w1, . . . , w2(m−k). Additionally, we create the evader node v̂ and three nodes a1, a2, a3. We will denote the set
of all nodes ai as A, the set of all nodes ui as U , and the set of all nodes wi as W .
• The set of layers L: For every Si ∈ S we add a layer αi.
• The set of occurrences of nodes in layers VL: Node uj ∈ U appears in layer αi if and only if uj ∈ Si. The evader
v̂, as well as all nodes in A and W , appear in all layers.
• The set of edges EL: In every layer we connect every node uj ∈ U occurring in this layer to every node in A.
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Figure 3: An illustration of the network used in the proof of Theorem 3. The red node represents the evader, while the
white nodes represent the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the solution to this problem instance.
Now, consider the following instance of the problem of Multilayer Local Hiding, (M, v̂, F, c, (dα)α∈L), where:
• M is the multilayer network we just constructed;
• v̂ is the evader;
• F = U ∪W is the set of contacts;
• c is the degree centrality measure;
• dαi = 3 for every αi ∈ L.
Next, let us consider what are the sets of edges that can be added between the evader v̂ and the contacts F in each
layer, so that the evader is hidden. In every layer αi the nodes in A as well as the nodes uj ∈ Si have degree 3, while
all other nodes have degree 0. We can connect v̂ to any two or less contacts and v̂ will still be hidden. If we connect
the evader to three contacts, they have to be nodes in Si (as these are the only nodes that potentially can have degree
greater than 3). We cannot connect v̂ to more than three contacts and still have v̂ hidden.
Now we will show that if there exists a solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem, then there
also exists a solution to the constructed instance of the Multilayer Local Hiding problem. Let S∗ be an exact cover of
U . For every Si ∈ S∗ we connect v̂ to every uj ∈ Si in layer αi. This way, v̂ becomes connected to all 3k contacts
from U , since all the sets in S∗ are pairwise disjoint. For every Si /∈ S∗ we connect v̂ to two nodes from W in layer
αi (since there are m− k such layers, we can connect v̂ to all 2(m− k) contacts from W this way).
To complete the proof we have to show that if there exists a solution to the constructed instance of the Multilayer
Local Hiding problem, then there also exists a solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem. Let
x be the number of layers from {α1, . . . , αm} in which v̂ has at most two neighbors, and let m − x be the number
of layers from {α1, . . . , αm} where v̂ has exactly three neighbors. Since v̂ has to be connected to all 3k + 2(m − k)
contacts, we have 2x + 3(m − x) ≥ 3k + 2(m − k), which gives us x ≤ m − k. However, since v̂ can connect to
nodes from W in layer αi if and only if it connects to at most two nodes in αi, we also have 2x ≥ 2(m− k). Hence,
we have x = m− k, i.e., v̂ is connected with all nodes from W in m− k layers from {α1, . . . , αm}. Therefore, in the
remaining k layers from {α1, . . . , αm}, the evader v̂ has to connect to all 3k nodes from U . Since the evader cannot
connect to more than three nodes in any layer αi, all these sets of neighbors from U have to be disjoint, thus forming
the solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 4. The problem of Multilayer Local Hiding problem is NP-complete given the closeness centrality measure.
Proof. The problem is trivially in NP, since after the addition of a given A∗ the closeness centrality rankings for all
layers can be computed in polynomial time.
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Figure 4: An illustration of the network used in the proof of Theorem 4. The red node represents the evader, while
white the nodes represent the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the solution to this problem instance.
Next, we prove that the problem is NP-hard. To this end, we show a reduction from the NP-complete problem of
Exact 3-Set Cover. The decision version of this problem is defined by a set of subsets S = {S1, . . . , Sm} of universe
U = {u1, . . . , u3k}, such that ∀i|Si| = 3. The goal is to determine whether there exist k pairwise disjoint elements of
S the sum of which equals U .
Given an instance of the problem of Exact 3-Set Cover, let us construct a multilayer network,M = (VL, EL, V ′, L),
as follows (Figure 4 depicts an instance of this network):
• The set of nodes V ′: For every ui ∈ U we create a node ui. In addition, we create the nodes w1, . . . , w2(m−k) and
a1, . . . , a2(m−k). Finally, we create the evader node v̂ and 5 nodes c1, . . . , c5. We will denote the set of all nodes ai
by A, the set of all nodes ci by C, the set of all nodes ui by U , and the set of all nodes wi by W .
• The set of layers L: For every Si ∈ S we add a layer αi.
• The set of occurrences of nodes in layers VL: Node uj ∈ U appears in layer αi if and only if uj ∈ Si. The evader
v̂, as well as all nodes in A, C, and W , appear in all layers.
• The set of edgesEL: In all layers we connect every nodewi with the node ai, and we create edges (c1, c2), (c1, c3), (c1, c4), (c4, c5).
Now, consider the following instance of the problem of Multilayer Local Hiding, (M, v̂, F, c, (dα)α∈L), where:
• M is the multilayer network we just constructed;
• v̂ is the evader;
• F = U ∪W is the set of contacts;
• c is the closeness centrality measure;
• dαi = 1 for every αi ∈ L.
Next, let us consider what are the sets of edges that can be added between the evader v̂ and the contacts F in each
layer, so that the evader is hidden. Notice that closeness centrality of the node c1 is 3 12 and it is not affected by the
edges added to v̂. Assume that we connect node v̂ with x nodes from U and y nodes from W . We then have the
following (for easier comparison we express the centrality values as fractions with the common denominator 6):
• cclos(v̂) = x+ 3y2 = 6x+9y6 ;
• cclos(wi) = x2 + 5y6 + 76 = 3x+5y+76 if wi ∈ N(v̂);
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Figure 5: An illustration of the network used in the proof of Theorem 5. The red node represents the evader, while the
white nodes represent the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the solution to this problem instance.
• cclos(c1) = 72 = 216 ;
No other node can have greater closeness centrality than v̂. We can connect v̂ with at most two of any of the contacts,
as node c1 will still have greater closeness centrality. If we want to connect v̂ with three contacts, these contacts have
to be nodes from U . If x + y = 3 and y > 0, or if x + y > 3, then the closeness centrality of v̂ is the highest in the
network, meaning that v̂ is not hidden.
Now we will show that if there exists a solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem, then there
also exists a solution to the constructed instance of the Multilayer Local Hiding problem. Let S∗ be an exact cover of
U . For every Si ∈ S∗ we connect v̂ to every uj ∈ Si in layer αi. This way, v̂ becomes connected to all 3k contacts
from U , since all the sets in S∗ are pairwise disjoint. For every Si /∈ S∗ we connect v̂ to two nodes from W in layer
αi (since there are m− k such layers, we can connect v̂ to all 2(m− k) contacts from W this way).
To complete the proof, we have to show that if there exists a solution A∗ to the constructed instance of the Multi-
layer Local Hiding problem, then there also exists a solution to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem.
Let z be the number of layers from {α1, . . . , αm} where v̂ has at most two neighbors, and let z − x be the number
of layers from {α1, . . . , αm} where v̂ has exactly three neighbors. Since we have to connect v̂ to all 3k + 2(m − k)
contacts, we have 2z+3(m−z) ≥ 3k+2(m−k), which gives us z ≤ m−k. However, since v̂ can connect to nodes
from W in layer αi if and only if it connects to at most two nodes in αi, we also have 2z ≥ 2(m−k). Hence, we have
z = m − k, i.e., v̂ connects to all nodes from W in m − k layers from {α1, . . . , αm}. Therefore, in the remaining k
layers from {α1, . . . , αm}, the evader v̂ has to connect with all 3k nodes from U . Since the evader cannot connect to
more than three nodes in any layer αi, all these sets of neighbors from U have to be disjoint, thus forming a solution
to the given instance of the Exact 3-Set Cover problem. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 5. The problem of Multilayer Local Hiding is NP-complete given the betweenness centrality measure.
Proof of Theorem 5: The problem is trivially in NP, since after the addition of a givenA∗ the betweenness centrality
rankings for all layers can be computed in polynomial time.
Next, we prove that the problem is NP-hard. To this end, we show a reduction from the NP-complete problem of
Finding k-Clique. The decision version of this problem is defined by a simple network, G = (V,E), and a constant,
k ∈ N. The goal is then to determine whether there exist k nodes in G that form a clique.
Let us assume that k < n − 1 (if this assumption does not hold then the solution can be computed in polynomial
time). Furthermore, let us assume that G is connected (if this does not hold, the problem can be considered separately
for each connected component). Given an instance of the problem of Finding k-Clique where k < n− 1, and given a
simple network G = (V,E), let us construct a multilayer network, M = (VL, EL, V ′, L), as follows (Figure 5 depicts
an instance of this network):
• The set of nodes V ′: This consists of the following sets of nodes: V = {v1, . . . , vn}, A = {a1, . . . , an}, B =
{b1, . . . , bn−k+2}, and C = {c1, . . . , cn+2}.
• The set of layers L: We create two layers, α and β.
• The set of occurrences of nodes in layers VL: Layer α contains all nodes in {v̂} ∪ V ∪ A ∪ C, while layer β
contains all nodes in {v̂} ∪ V ∪B.
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Table 2: Summary of our results regarding approximation algorithms.
Centrality Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding Maximum Multilayer Local Hiding
Degree can be solved in polynomial time greedy algorithm is 2-approximation
Closeness - cannot be approximated within |F |1− for any  > 0
Betweenness cannot be approximated within |F |1− for any  > 0 cannot be approximated within |F |1− for any  > 0
• The set of edges EL: In layer α we create an edge between two nodes vi, vj ∈ V if and only if this edge was
present in G. We also create an edge (vi, ai) for every vi, and an edge between every pair ai, ai+1. Finally, for
every node ci ∈ C : i ≤ n, we create edges (ci, cn+1) and (ci, cn+2). In layer β we create an edge (bi, bn−k+2)
for every node bi ∈ B : i < n− k + 2.
Now, consider the following instance of the problem of Multilayer Local Hiding, (M, v̂, F, c, (dα)α∈L), where:
M is the multilayer network we just constructed; v̂ is the evader; F = V is the set of contacts; c is the betweenness
centrality measure; and dα = 3n + 2 and dβ = 1 are the safety margins. Given this, let us consider what are the sets
of edges that can be added between the evader v̂ and the contacts F in each layer, so that the evader is hidden.
Since dα = 3n + 2, then apart from the evader v̂, the betweenness centrality of every node in layer α must be
greater than that of v̂; otherwise the evader v̂ would not be hidden in α. Also note that the betweenness centrality of
every node ci ∈ C : i ≤ n equals 1n , and all nodes other than v̂ have non-zero betweenness centrality.
Now if v̂ gets connected to any two nodes vi, vj ∈ V that are not connected to one another, then v̂ controls one
shortest path of length 2 between vi and vj . Note that there can be at most n − 2 other shortest paths of length 2
between vi and vj (each such path goes through some node vk ∈ V \ {vi, vj} if and only if vk is connected to both vi
and vj). Thus, the betweenness centrality of v̂ is at least 1n−1 . Consequently, all nodes that v̂ is connected to in layer
α must form a clique in order for v̂ to be hidden in α.
Consider a situation in which the evader v̂ is connected to x nodes from V in layer β (notice that x ≤ n). Its
betweenness centrality is then x(x−1)2 , as it controls all shortest paths between pairs of its neighbors, but not any other
shortest paths. At the same time, the betweenness centrality of the node bn−k+2 is
(n−k+1)(n−k)
2 (as it controls all
shortest paths between pairs of other nodes from B), which is greater than the betweenness centrality of v̂ if and only
if x ≤ n− k. All other nodes in the layer have betweenness centrality 0. Thus, v̂ is hidden in β iff it has at most n− k
neighbors.
Now we will show that if there exists a solution to the given instance of the problem of Finding k-Clique, then
there also exists a solution to the constructed instance of the problem of Multilayer Local Hiding. To this end, let V ∗
be a group of k nodes forming a clique in G. Let us create A∗ by connecting v̂ to nodes from V ∗ in layer α and to
nodes from F \ V ∗ in layer β. As argued above, for such A∗, the evader v̂ is hidden in both layers, hence A∗ is a
solution to the constructed instance of the Multilayer Local Hiding problem.
To complete the proof we have to show that if there exists a solution A∗ to the constructed instance of the problem
of Multilayer Local Hiding, then there also exists a solution to the given instance of the problem of Finding k-Clique.
Since v̂ can be connected in layer β to at most n− k nodes from V , it has to have at least k neighbors from V in layer
α As shown above, in order for v̂ to be hidden in α, all of its neighbors must form a clique. Hence, the neighbors of v̂
in layer α form a clique in G. This concludes the proof. 
3.5 Approximation Analysis
In this section we present the analysis of optimization versions of our problems (see Table 2 for a summary).
Theorem 6. The Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. For a given k ∈ N it is possible to connect the evader with k contacts if and only if min(k, |{v ∈ F : |N(v)| =
k+ |N(v̂)|}|) + |{v ∈ V : |N(v)| > k+ |N(v̂)|}| ≥ d. It is because the only nodes that count towards satisfying the
safety margin are those that already have degree greater than k + |N(v̂)|, or the contacts that have degree k and their
degree will be increased to k + |N(v̂)|+ 1 when they are connected with the evader (notice that since we are adding
k edges, there can be at most k such contacts).
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Figure 6: An illustration of the network used in the proof of Theorem 7. The red node represents the evader, while the
white nodes represent the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the optimal solution to this problem instance.
Theorem 7. Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem given the closeness centrality cannot be approximated
within |F |1− for any  > 0, unless P=NP.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, we will use the result by Zuckerman [31] that the Maximum Independent Set
problem cannot be approximated within |V |1− for any  > 0, unless P = NP (notice that the Maximum Independent
Set problem is equivalent to the Maximum Clique problem on a complementary network). The Maximum Independent
Set problem is defined by a simple network, G = (V,E). The goal is to identify the maximum (in terms of size) group
of nodes in G that are independent, i.e., they do not induce any edges.
First, we will show a function f(G) that based on an instance of the problem of Maximum Independent Set, defined
by a simple network G = (V,E), constructs an instance of the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding. In what follows
we will assume that n ≥ 4 (the problem can be easily solve in constant time for n < 4).
Let a multilayer network, M = (VL, EL, V ′, L), be defined as follows (Figure 6 depicts an instance of this
network):
• The set of nodes V ′: For every node, vi ∈ V , we create a node vi, a node ui, a node yi, six nodes ai,1, . . . , ai,6,
and a node bi. We will denote the set of all nodes vi by V , the set of all nodes ui by U , the set of all nodes yi by Y ,
the set of all nodes ai,j by A, and the set of all nodes bi by B. Additionally, we create the evader node v̂, a node w
and six sets of nodes C = {c1, . . . , c3n−4}, C ′ = {c′1, . . . , c′n}, and C ′′ = {c′′1 , . . . , c′′n−1}, Z = {z1, . . . , z5n+1},
Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n}, and Z ′′ = {z′′1 , . . . , z′′3n}.
• The set of layers L: We create layers α, β, n layers γ1, . . . , γn, and n layers δ1, . . . , δn.
• The set of occurrences of nodes in layers VL: Layer α contains occurrences of nodes {v̂, w}∪A∪V ∪U . Layer β
contains occurrences of nodes {v̂}∪A∪B∪C ′. A given layer γi contains occurrences of nodes {vi}∪C∪C ′∪C ′′.
A given layer δi contains occurrences of nodes {yi} ∪ Z ∪ Z ′ ∪ Z ′′.
• The set of edges EL:
– In layer α: for every pair of nodes vi ∈ V, uj ∈ U we create an edge (vi, uj) if and only if the edge (vi, vj)
was present in G. For every node ui we create edges (ui, vi) and (ui, w). For every node ai,j we create an
edge (ai,j , vi). We also create an edge between every pair of nodes ui, uj ∈ U . Finally, we create an edge
(v̂, w).
– In layer β: for every node ai,j we create an edge (ai,j , bi). We also create an edge (v̂, bi) for every node bi
and an edge (v̂, c′i) for every node c
′
i.
– In a given layer γi: for every node cj we create an edge (vi, cj) if and only if j ≤ 3n − 4 − |NG(vi)| (i.e.,
we connect vi with 3n − 4 − |NG(vi)| first nodes from C). For every node c′j we create an edge (c′j , cj) if
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and only if j ≤ n − |NG(vi)| (i.e., we connect n − |NG(vi)| first nodes from C ′ with their C counterparts).
For every node c′′j we create an edge (c
′′
j , c
′
1) if and only if j ≤ |NG(vi)| (i.e., we connect |NG(vi)| first nodes
from C ′′ with the node c′1).
– In a given layer δi: for every node zj we create an edge (yi, zj). For every node z′j we create an edge (z′j , zj).
For every node z′′j we create an edge (z
′′
j , z
′
1) if and only if j ≤ n+2i (i.e., we connect n+2i first nodes from
Z ′′ with the node z′1).
To complete the constructed instance of the problem let:
• v̂ be the evader;
• F = V be the set of contacts;
• c be the closeness centrality measure;
• d = n be the safety margin.
Hence, the formula of the function f is f(G) = (M, v̂, F, c, d). Let A∗ be the solution to the constructed instance
of the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem. The function g computing corresponding solution to the instance
G of the Maximum Independent Set problem is now g(A∗) = {vi ∈ V : (v̂α, vαi ) ∈ A∗}, i.e., the nodes forming the
independent set are the contacts that the evader is connected to.
Now, we will show that g(A∗) is indeed a correct solution to G, i.e., that the nodes form an independent set. Let
xi = |NG(vi) ∩ g(A∗)|, i.e., the number of neighbours of vi in G connected to v̂. Let us compute the closeness
centrality of all nodes in the network and compare it with the closeness centrality of the evader:
• cclos(M, v̂) = 2n+ 1 + |A∗|+ 6n+n2 + n−|A
∗|
3 = 5
5
6n+
2
3 |A∗|+ 1;
• if vi ∈ g(A∗) then cclos(M,vi) = 3n+4+ 2n−|NG(vi)|+|A
∗|−xi−1
2 +
n+6|NG(vi)|+5|A∗|−5xi−6
3 +
6n−6|NG(vi)|−6|A∗|+6xi
4 =
5 56n+
2
3 |A∗|+ 1 12 − 23xi;
• if vi /∈ g(A∗) then cclos(M,vi) = 3n+ 3 + 2n−|NG(vi)|2 + n+6|NG(vi)|3 + 6n−6|NG(vi)|−64 = 5 56n+ 1 12 , hence
cclos(M,vi) < cclos(M, v̂) for |A∗| > 0;
• cclos(M,w) = n+ 1 + n2 + 6n3 = 3 12n+ 1 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M,ui) ≤ 2n+ 6n2 = 5n < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M,ai,j) ≤ 2 + n+72 + 2n−23 + 6(n−1)4 = 2 23n+ 3 13 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M, bi) = 7 + n−12 + (n−1)63 = 2 12n+ 4 12 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M, ci) ≤ n+ 1 + 4n−62 + n−13 = 3 13n− 2 13 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M, c′i) ≤ n+ 1 + 3n−12 + 8n−43 + n−14 = 5 512n− 1 112 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M, c′′i ) ≤ 1 + n−12 + n3 + 3n−54 + n−15 = 1 4760n− 1 1920 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M,yi) = 5n+ 1 + n2 + n+2i3 = 5 56n+ 1 + 23 i;
• cclos(M, zi) ≤ n+ 1 + 8n2 + n−13 = 5 13n+ 23 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M, z′i) ≤ 3n+ 1 + n2 + 5n3 + n−14 = 5 512n+ 34 < cclos(M, v̂);
• cclos(M, z′′i ) = 1 + 3n2 + n3 + 5n4 + n−15 = 3 1760n+ 45 < cclos(M, v̂).
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Figure 7: An illustration of the network used in the proof of Theorem 8. The red node represents the evader, while the
white nodes represent the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the optimal solution to this problem instance.
Notice that the only nodes that can have greater closeness centrality than the evader are the nodes in V that the
evader is connected to and the nodes in Y . For a given node yi it has a greater closeness centrality score than the
evader if and only if the evader is connected to less than i nodes from V (i.e., when |A∗| < i), as:
cclos(M, v̂)− cclos(M,yi) = 2
3
(|A∗| − i).
Hence, since the safety margin is d = n and the only other nodes that can have greater closeness centrality than the
evader are the nodes in V that the evader is connected to. Hence, every node in V that the evader connects to must
have greater closeness centrality than the evader, in order for the safety margin to be maintained (there are exactly n
nodes in Y , and every edge additional edge in A∗ causes the evader to get greater closeness centrality than one of the
nodes in Y ). However, node vi ∈ V that the evader is connected to has greater closeness centrality than the evader if
and only if xi = 0, i.e., no neighbors of vi are connected to v̂, as:
cclos(M, v̂)− cclos(M,vi) = 2
3
xi − 1
2
.
This implies that, if v̂ is hidden then all nodes from V that are connected to v̂ must form an independent set.
Therefore, the optimal solution to the constructed instance of the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem is
returning nodes from V forming in G an independent set of the maximum size. Hence, the optimal solution corre-
sponds to the optimal solution to the given instance of the Maximum Independent Set problem.
Now, assume that there exists an approximation algorithm for the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem
with ratio |F |1− for some  > 0. Let us use this algorithm to solve the constructed instance f(G), acquiring solution
A∗. and consider solution g(A∗) to the given instance of the Maximum Clique problem. Since the size of the optimal
solution is the same for both instances, we obtained an approximation algorithm that solves Maximum Independent
Set problem to within |V |1− for  > 0. However, Zuckerman [31] shown that the Maximum Independent Set problem
cannot be approximated within |V |1− for any  > 0, unless P = NP . Therefore, such approximation algorithm for
the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem cannot exist, unless P = NP . This concludes the proof.
Theorem 8. Both Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding and Maximum Multilayer Local Hiding problems given the
betweenness centrality cannot be approximated within |F |1− for any  > 0, unless P=NP.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, we will use the result by Zuckerman [31] that the Maximum Clique problem
cannot be approximated within |V |1− for any  > 0, unless P = NP . The Maximum Clique problem is defined by
a simple network, G = (V,E). The goal is to identify the maximum (in terms of size) group of nodes in G that form
a clique.
First, we will show a function f(G) that based on an instance of the problem of Maximum Clique, defined by a
simple network G = (V,E), constructs either an instance of the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding or an instance
of the Maximum Multilayer Local Hiding.
Let a multilayer network, M = (VL, EL, V ′, L), be defined as follows (Figure 7 depicts an instance of this
network):
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• The set of nodes V ′: For every node, vi ∈ V , we create a node vi and a node ai. Additionally, we create the evader
node v̂ and the set of nodes C = {c1, . . . , cn+2}.
• The set of layers L: We create only a single layer α.
• The set of occurrences of nodes in layers VL: All nodes occur in layer α.
• The set of edges EL: In layer α we create an edge between two nodes vi, vj ∈ V if and only if this edge was
present in G. We also create an edge (vi, ai) for every vi, and an edge between every pair ai, ai+1. Finally, for
every node ci ∈ C : i ≤ n, we create edges (ci, cn+1) and (ci, cn+2).
To complete the constructed instance of the problem let:
• v̂ be the evader;
• F = V be the set of contacts;
• c be the betweenness centrality measure;
• d = 3n+ 2 be the safety margin in the global version;
• dα = 3n+ 2 be the safety margin in the local version.
Hence, the formula of the function f is f(G) = (M, v̂, F, c, d) for the global version of the problem and f(G) =
(M, v̂, F, c, (dα)α∈L) for the local version of the problem. Notice that since network M has only one layer, both
problems are equivalent. In the following we will focus on the global version of the problem.
Let A∗ be the solution to the constructed instance of the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem. The
function g computing corresponding solution to the instance G of the Maximum Clique problem is now g(A∗) =
{v ∈ V : (v̂, v) ∈ A∗}, i.e., the nodes forming the clique are the contacts that the evader is connected to.
Now, we will show that g(A∗) is indeed a correct solution to G, i.e., that the nodes form a clique. Notice that,
since d = 2n + 2k + 3, all other nodes must have greater betweenness centrality than the evader in order for v̂ to be
hidden. Notice also that the betweenness centrality of every node ci for i ≤ n is 1n . Moreover, after adding A∗ all
nodes other than v̂ have non-zero betweenness centrality. If v̂ gets connected to at least two nodes from F that are
not connected to each other, then v̂ controls one of at most n − 1 shortest path between them (other paths can only
go through nodes in V ) and thus the betweenness centrality of v̂ is at least 1n−1 . Therefore, in order to get hidden, v̂
cannot control any shortest paths in the network. This implies that, if v̂ is hidden then all nodes that are connected to
v̂ must form a clique.
Therefore, the optimal solution to the constructed instance of the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem is
returning nodes from V forming a clique of maximum size. Since the structure of connections between the nodes V
is the same as in the network G, the optimal solution corresponds to the optimal solution to the given instance of the
Maximum Clique problem.
Now, assume that there exists an approximation algorithm for the Maximum Multilayer Global Hiding problem
with ratio |F |1− for some  > 0. Let us use this algorithm to solve the constructed instance f(G), acquiring solution
A∗. and consider solution g(A∗) to the given instance of the Maximum Clique problem. Since the size of the optimal
solution is the same for both instances, we obtained an approximation algorithm that solves Maximum Clique problem
to within |V |1− for  > 0. However, Zuckerman [31] shown that the Maximum Clique problem cannot be approx-
imated within |V |1− for any  > 0, unless P = NP . Therefore, such approximation algorithm for the Maximum
Multilayer Global Hiding problem cannot exist, unless P = NP . This concludes the proof.
Theorem 9. The greedy algorithm is a 2-approximation for the Maximum Multilayer Local Hiding problem given the
degree centrality. The bound is tight.
Proof. First, let us analyze the structure of a solution to the Maximum Multilayer Local Hiding problem given the
degree centrality. Let δα be the degree of the dα-th node in the degree centrality ranking of the nodes in V α, let δα0
be the initial (i.e., before any edges to the contacts are added) degree of the evader in layer α, and let Fα be the set of
occurrences of contacts in layer α, i.e., Fα = {vα : v ∈ F}. An algorithm solving the Maximum Multilayer Local
Hiding problem can either:
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a) connect the evader to at most kα = δα − 1− δα0 of freely selected nodes from Fα, as this way the degree of the
evader is increased to at most δα − 1, and the nodes from the first dα positions of the degree ranking before the
addition continue to have greater degree than the evader when the new edges are added;
b) connect the evader to exactly δα− δα0 nodes from Fα (notice that δα− δα0 = kα+1). This increases the degree
of the evader to δα, hence the new connections must include at least dα − |{vα ∈ V α : |Nα(v)| > δα}| nodes
with degree exactly δα. As a result, there will now exist dα nodes with degree at least δα + 1 and the safety
margin will be maintained.
First, notice that the sets of potential connections in both a) and b) can be easily computed in polynomial time,
hence the greedy algorithm can use them to optimize the choice of edges added in a single layer.
Notice also that the evader can never add more than kα + 1 edges in layer α, as her degree will then increase to at
least δα + 2. Since adding a set of connections between the evader and the contacts cannot increase the degree of any
contact by more than one, the dα-th node in the degree centrality ranking of the nodes in V α will have degree at most
δα + 1. Hence, the safety margin cannot be maintained.
Finally, notice that if kα < 0, then the degree of the evader is at least δα before adding any edges, which puts her
within the top dα positions of the degree centrality ranking. Since increasing the degree of any other nodes can be
realized only by adding an edge to the evader (which in turn increases the evader’s degree even more), the problem
does not have a solution if kα < 0 for any layer α.
The greedy algorithm iterates over the layers and for each layer it connects the evader with maximum possible
number of contacts that the evader has not been connected with yet. Notice that it is never beneficial to connect the
evader with a given contact in more than one layer, hence any solution doing so has an equivalent solution without the
redundant edge(s). In what follows, we will only consider solutions without the redundant edges.
Let us now compare a solution A$ returned by the greedy algorithm with an optimal solution A∗. We will denote
by A$α the set of contacts connected to the evader by the greedy algorithm in layer α, i.e., A
$
α = {v ∈ V α : (v̂α, vα) ∈
A$}, and by A∗α the set of contacts connected to the evader by the optimal algorithm in layer α, i.e., A∗α = {v ∈ V α :
(v̂α, vα) ∈ A∗}. We iterate over the layers of the network in the same order as the greedy algorithm; let this order be
α1, . . . , α|L|. Contacts that the optimal solution connects the evader to in a given layer αi can be grouped into three
pairwise disjoint sets:
• Contacts that could not have been selected in layer αi by the greedy algorithm, as they were selected by it in
one of the previous layers, i.e.:
Xαi = {v ∈ A∗αi : v /∈ A$αi ∧ ∃j<iv ∈ A$αj};
• Contacts that are not selected by the greedy algorithm in layer αi, but they could have been selected, i.e.:
Y αi = {v ∈ A∗αi : v /∈ A$αi ∧ ¬∃j<iv ∈ A$αj};
• Contacts that are selected by both the greedy algorithm and the optimal solution in layer αi, i.e.:
Zαi = {v ∈ A∗αi : v ∈ A$αi}.
We will show that |A∗αi | − |A$αi | ≤ |Xαi |, i.e., the difference between the number of edges added in layer αi by
the optimal solution and by the greedy algorithm cannot be greater than |Xαi |. We will prove this by contradiction.
To this end, assume that in some layer αi the said difference is greater than |Xαi |, i.e., |A∗αi | > |A$αi |+ |Xαi |. Since
|A∗αi | = |Xαi | + |Y αi | + |Zαi |, we get that in this layer: |A$αi | < |Y αi | + |Zαi |. However, since none of the nodes
from Y αi ∪Zαi were selected by the greedy algorithm in the previous layers, the greedy algorithm would have chosen
to connect the evader with contacts from Y αi ∪Zαi , as it connects the evader with a greater number of nodes in layer
αi than the solution A$. Therefore, the difference between the number of edges added in layer αi by the optimal
solution and by the greedy algorithm cannot be greater than |Xαi |, i.e., |A∗αi | − |A$αi | ≤ |Xαi |. Summing over all
layers yields: ∑
αi∈L
|A∗αi | ≤
∑
αi∈L
|A$αi |+
∑
αi∈L
|Xαi |.
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Figure 8: An illustration of the network showing the tightness of the bound given in Theorem 9. The red node
represents the evader, while white the nodes represent the contacts. Dashed (green) edges represent the optimal
solution to this problem instance, while dotted (blue) edges represent the solution returned by the greedy algorithm.
Since any v is a member of only a single set Xαi (as we assumed that the optimal solution does not contain any
redundant edges) and since from the definition of Xαi we have that ∃j<iv ∈ A$αj , we get that
∑
αi∈L |Xαi | ≤ |A$|.
Given that
∑
αi∈L |A∗αi | = |A∗| and
∑
αi∈L |Xαi | = |A$| we get:
|A∗| ≤ 2|A$|.
Since we consider solution without redundant edges, the size of each solution is equal to the number of contact
connected with the evader by each solution. Therefore, the greedy algorithm is a 2-approximation.
Figure 8 presents an example of the network, where the bound is tight, i.e., the optimal solution connects the
evader with exactly twice as many contacts as the greedy algorithm. The green edges represent the optimal solution,
connecting the evader with all eight contacts, while the greedy algorithm (the result of which is represented by the
blue edges) connects the evader to only four contacts.
4 Heuristics & Empirical Analysis
Given that most computational results are negative, we shift now our attention towards developing heuristic algorithms
that provide efficient, albeit not optimal, solutions.
4.1 Network Datasets
In our experiments we use both randomly generated and real-life multilayer networks. As for the randomly generated
ones, we use the following standard network generation models:
• Random graphs, generated using the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model [7]. We denote by ER(n, k) a network with n nodes
with expected degree of k.
• Small-world networks, generated using the Watts-Strogatz model [27]. We denote by WS(n, k) a network with
n nodes, an average degree of k, and a rewiring probability of 14 .
• Scale-free networks, generated using the Baraba´si-Albert model [2]. We denote by BA(n, k) a network with n
nodes, with k edges added with each new node. The size of the initial clique is k.
To construct a multilayer network with n nodes and l layers using a network generation modelX ∈ {ER,WS,BA},
we perform the following steps:
1. We create the set of node occurrences such that, for every node v and every layer α, the node v occurs in α with
probability pO. If, at the end of this process, v does not occur on any layer, then we create one occurrence of v
in a layer chosen uniformly at random; this ensures that every node occurs in at least one layer.
2. For every layer, α, we generate a network X(|V α|, k) whose set of nodes consists of all the nodes that occur in
α from the previous step.
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Table 3: Characteristics of the considered datasets.
Dataset |V | |L| |VL| |EL|
FF-TW-YT 574 3 1722 5681
Provisional IRA 937 5 1570 3398
Lazega law firm 71 3 211 2051
CS Aarhus 61 5 224 948
3. For every two occurrences of the same node, we create an inter-layer edge between them with probability pC .
This results in a network with diagonal couplings.
The network created using these steps will be denoted by X l(n, k). In our experiments, we use networks where
pO = pC =
1
2 and where the number of layers is l = 3 (the choice of 3 layers was inspired by the work of Gera et
al. [10]). Additionally, we use the following real-life networks:
• FF-TW-YT dataset [5] consisting of a network of connections between 1722 individuals that have an account in
each of the following social media site: Friendfeed, Twitter, and YouTube; each of these sites is represented by
a separate layer in the network.
• Provisional IRA dataset [11] consisting of the network of connections between members of the Provisional Irish
Republic Army in the period between 1970 and 1998. The network consists of 937 nodes and 5 layers, where
layers correspond to contacts between organization members in different time periods.
• Lazega law firm dataset [17] consisting of connections between attorneys working for a US corporate law firm.
The network consists of 71 nodes and 3 layers, where each layer corresponds to a different type of relationship,
i.e., friendship, professional cooperation and mentorship.
• CS Aarhus dataset [18] consisting of connections between the employees of the Computer Science department
at Aarhus. The network consists of 61 nodes and 5 layers, where each layer corresponds to a different type of
relationship between employees, e.g., Facebook friendships, co-authorship of papers, etc.
Table 3 presents detailed characteristics of the considered datasets.
4.2 Heuristic Algorithms
Recall that the “group of contacts” refers to the set of individuals whom the evader wishes to connect to. We will refer
to each member of this group as a “contact”. Notice that a typical member of a social network does not have complete
knowledge about the network’s structure. Hence, we assume that the evader’s knowledge is limited to the connections
between the contacts, as well as the degree of each contact. All of our heuristic algorithms take only this information
into account. Specifically:
• Random—This heuristic connects the evader to every contact in a layer chosen uniformly at random out of all
layers in which both the evader and that contact occur.
• All in one—This heuristic (Algorithm 1) focuses on creating edges between the evader and her contacts in as
few layers as possible. The intuition is that, by focusing all activities of the evader in a small number of layers
(if possible, in only one layer), the global centrality measures would assign low importance to the evader. Even
though this heuristic might seem overly simplified, we include it as a reasonable baseline—a “rule of thumb”
that could be readily implemented by members of the general public.
• Fringe—This heuristic (Algorithm 2) focuses on minimizing the number of nodes that are in close vicinity of
the evader. The main idea behind this heuristic is to maximize the average distance between the evader and other
nodes, in the hope of achieving low ranking according to closeness centrality. Given the limited knowledge of
the evader about the network topology, the heuristic cannot analyze any nodes whose distance from the evader is
greater than 2. Therefore, the heuristic simply focuses on minimizing the number of neighbors of the contacts.
19
Algorithm 1 “All in one” heuristic
Input: Multilayer network M , the evader v̂, contacts F
Output: Edges to be added to the network, i.e., the set A∗
1: A∗ ← ∅
2: F ∗ ← F
3: L∗ ← {α ∈ L : v̂ ∈ V α}
4: while |F ∗| > 0 do
5: α∗ ← argmaxα∈L∗ |F ∗ ∩ V α|
6: for v ∈ F ∗ ∩ V α do
7: A∗ = A∗ ∪ {(v̂α∗ , vα∗)}
8: F ∗ = F ∗ \ V α
9: return A∗
Algorithm 2 Fringe heuristic
Input: Multilayer network M , the evader v̂, contacts F
Output: Edges to be added to the network, i.e., the set A∗
1: A∗ ← ∅
2: L∗ ← {α ∈ L : v̂ ∈ V α}
3: for v ∈ F ∩ V α do
4: α∗ ← argminα∈L∗ |Nα(v) \ F |
5: A∗ = A∗ ∪ {(v̂α∗ , vα∗)}
6: return A∗
• Density—This heuristic (Algorithm 3) is meant to link the evader to densely connected groups in each layer.
Here, the underlying idea is that edges between the contacts act as “shortcuts”, preventing the shortest paths in
the network from running through the evader, thus reducing her betweenness centrality. Intuitively, the heuristic
prefers to connect the evader to a contact v in layers where v is connected to many nodes that are already
connected to the evader (the term |{w ∈ F : (v̂α, wα) ∈ A∗} ∩ Nα(v)| in the numerator), as well as layers
where v has many connections with other contacts (the term |F ∩ Nα(v)| in the numerator) to increase the
chance of creating additional “shortcuts”. Finally, the heuristic prefers layers with fewer contacts connected to
the evader (the term |{w ∈ F : (v̂α, wα) ∈ A∗}|) to distribute the evader’s connections among layers more
uniformly, thereby helping her hide from local centrality measures.
4.3 The Simulation Process
In our simulations, we consider local degree, closeness and betweenness centrality, as well as global closeness and
betweenness centrality. The reason behind excluding global degree centrality is that, as stated in Observation 1, for
any given group of contacts, the centrality ranking of the evader does not depend on the way in which connections are
distributed across the different layers. The simulation process is as follows. For every network, we pick as potential
evaders the nodes that are ranked among the top 10 according to at least one of the five considered centrality measures.
We then simulate the hiding process for each one of those evaders separately. To this end, we choose the group of
contacts to be the neighbors of the evader in the original network. After that, we remove all original edges between
the evader and those contacts, and act as if the evader was never connected to those individuals, but rather wants to
connect to them while remaining hidden from centrality analysis. Finally, we connect the evader to the contacts using
edges chosen by one of our heuristics. We record the difference between the ranking of the evader in the original,
unchanged network, and in the network after running the heuristic. In so doing, we quantify the impact of strategically
choosing the relationships to be formed with the group of contacts. Note that for the local centrality measures, we need
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Algorithm 3 Density heuristic
Input: Multilayer network M , the evader v̂, contacts F
Output: Edges to be added to the network, i.e., the set A∗
1: A∗ ← ∅
2: L∗ ← {α ∈ L : v̂ ∈ V α}
3: for v ∈ F ∩ V α do
4: α∗ ← argmaxα∈L∗ |{w∈F :(v̂
α,wα)∈A∗}∩Nα(v)|+|F∩Nα(v)|
max(1,|{w∈F :(v̂α,wα)∈A∗}|)
5: A∗ = A∗ ∪ {(v̂α∗ , vα∗)}
6: return A∗
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Figure 9: Given different centrality measures and different networks with 2000 nodes and 3 layers (ER—Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi, WS—Watts-Strogatz, BA—Baraba´si-Albert), the figure depicts the average change in centrality ranking of
10 different evaders as a result of execution of hiding heuristics. The experiment is repeated 100 times, with a new
network generated each time. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
to aggregate the centrality scores for each layer into a single ranking for the entire network. We do so by assigning to
each node v the following centrality score: 1minα∈L rα(v) , where r
α(v) is the ranking of v in layer α.
4.4 Simulation Results
The results of our simulations are presented in Figures 9 and 10. Each row corresponds to a network, and each column
corresponds to centrality measure. Each bar represents the change in the evader’s ranking after using a particular
heuristic (the color of the bar corresponds to the heuristic being used). A negative change implies that the ranking of
the evader decreased, i.e., she became more hidden. In contrast, a positive change implies that the heuristic backfired,
i.e., the evader actually became more exposed.
As can be seen, there is no heuristic that dominates the others, i.e., no heuristic is superior against all centrality
measures. The “All in one” heuristic proves to be effective in hiding from global closeness centrality in many cases.
Unfortunately, if the network is analyzed with one of the local centrality measures, the evader may become even more
exposed. For every considered centrality measure, either the Density or the Fringe heuristic is among the most effective
methods for hiding, and they never make the evader more exposed. Finally, commenting on the results of the Random
heuristic, they demonstrate that it is relatively effective to simply get rid of excess links (i.e., avoid connecting with
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Figure 10: Given different centrality measures and different networks, the figure depicts the average change in
centrality ranking of 10 different evaders as a result of execution of different hiding heuristics. For the randomly
generate networks the experiment is repeated 100 times, with a new network generated each time. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
each node in more than one layer) and spread the remaining connections uniformly.
Our results show also that the global centrality measures are on average much harder to hide from than their local
counterparts. This demonstrates the importance of analyzing the entire structure of a multilayer network, rather than
focusing on each layer separately.
Regarding the size of the networks used in the simulations, note that the heuristics use only local information and
can be easily applied in much larger networks. However, the cost of computing complete rankings of the multilayer
centrality measures, which is necessary for us to present our results, grows quickly with the size of the network. Hence,
we present results for the networks of moderate size.
5 Conclusions
We studied the problem of evading centrality analysis in multilayer networks, and analyzed this problem both theo-
retically and empirically, thereby initiating the study of evading social network analysis tools in multilayer networks.
Interesting future directions include developing more sophisticated heuristics for evading centrality measures, and
analyzing the problem of evading link-prediction algorithms in multilayer networks.
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